12月1日高级经济学讲座第161期

　　一、报告题目
　　Strategical Interactions on Municipal Public Safety Spending with Correlated Private Information
　　二、报告人
　　杨超，上海财经大学，研究领域：Microeconometrics, Applied Econometrics, Applied Microeconomics，2015年获得美国俄亥俄州立大学经济学博士学位。已在国际代表性期刊发表一系列文章，包括Journal of Econometrics， Annuals of Economics and Finance等。
　　三、报告时间
　　2016年12月1日15：30
　　四、报告地点
　　知新楼B423聚贤报告厅
　　五、报告摘要
　　We investigate interactions of public safety spending among spatially related local jurisdictions in a framework of an incomplete information game both theoretically and empirically. Incorporating the mobility of residents and externality of public safety services, it is found that the public safety spending of a municipal government is negatively related to those of its neighbors, which is empirically supported by a general interaction model with correlated private information using the data on municipalities in North Carolina. In this case, when one of its neighbors increases its spending on public safety services by 1 million dollars, a municipal government will reduce its own expense by 0.1487 million dollars, showing strong "free-riding'' effects.
　　六、主办单位
　　山东大学经济学院